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Impact of Cohorting for MultidrugResistant Organisms with and without
Real-Time Feedback
To the Editor—Creating a cohorting area is recommended by
several guidelines as a strategy to prevent transmission of
multidrug-resistant organisms.1,2 The use of a cohort area,
coupled with real-time feedback of compliance with infection
prevention measures (eg, hand hygiene and gowning and
gloving for isolation patients), has successfully contained
multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii transmission in
a resource-limited setting.3 The additive effect of patient cohorting and real-time feedback versus the creation of a defined cohort area alone has not been previously examined.
Observation and real-time feedback is a resource-intensive

practice; therefore, understanding its contribution to compliance with infection prevention measures is important. We
conducted a study to evaluate the effect of creating a cohort
area with and without frequent real-time feedback on compliance with infection prevention practices to prevent transmission of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs).
A 2-period observational study to evaluate compliance with
infection prevention practices was conducted in a 30-bed
open unit at Thammasat University, Pathumthani, Thailand.
The unit nurse-to-patient ratio was 1 : 8. We created an 8bed cohort area in the unit, with 1 nurse per shift being
assigned to care for patients in this area. Two 1-hour educational sessions per month were provided to all unit nurses
on the importance of adherence to the infection control measures. Observations using a standardized data collection tool
were performed by infectious diseases physicians (S.W. and
P.L.) on isolation equipment preparation (eg, isolation signs
being posted and availability of isolation equipment, such as
gloves, gowns, masks, alcohol gel, and stethoscopes), infection
control practices (eg, hand hygiene before and after patient
contact, appropriate use of gloves and gowns, and environmental cleaning), and time spent with each patient. Hand
hygiene compliance was defined as the number of observations for which hand hygiene was performed before and after
patient contact divided by the total number of observed hand
hygiene opportunities. Monitoring of environmental cleaning
was performed as described elsewhere.3 In period 1 (September 1–30, 2012) no feedback of observations was given to
staff, while in period 2 (November 1–30, 2012) real-time
feedback on infection control adherence was provided to
healthcare workers (HCWs) in the cohort area. Real-time
feedback was performed by an infection control nurse when
HCWs did not perform hand washing or wear an isolation
gown 3 times a week. To avoid an impact of education on
infection control practices, we allowed a 1-month washout
period (October 1–31, 2012) during which neither cohorting
nor education was performed.
During the study, there were 600 observations performed
(300 in period 1 and 300 in period 2). In period 1 there was
no significant difference in isolation equipment preparation
and infection control compliance between the cohort and
noncohort areas. In period 2 there was a significantly higher
compliance with infection control practices in the cohort versus the noncohort area, and HCWs spent more time caring
for patients in the cohort area (Table 1). Notably, compliance
with gown use was still low in the cohort area (37.2%). When
comparing period 2 with period 1, there was a significant
increase in the frequency of environmental cleaning in the
cohort and noncohort area, and the proportion of each specific MDRO was different. However, there was no significant
change in other isolation precaution practices within the noncohort area (Table 1).
Contact isolation is a key measure to prevent the spread
of MDROs by indirect contact in the hospital. Previous data
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table 1. Outcome of Cohort Section with and without Real-Time Feedback
Period 1 (September 1–30, 2012)
Variable
Nurse-to-patient ratio, mean Ⳳ SD
Resource utilization
Isolation sign posted
Isolation equipment provided
Hand hygiene
Contact isolation
Gloves used
Gown worn
Time spent with patient
≤2 minutes
12 minutes
Type of MDROsa
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae
Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Acinetobacter baumannii
MRSA
Environmental cleaning
≤2 times per day
12 times per day

Period 2 (November 1–31, 2012)

Cohort
(n p 150)

Noncohort
(n p 150)

Cohort
(n p 150)

Noncohort
(n p 150)

0.21 Ⳳ 0.02**

0.17 Ⳳ 0.01

0.25 Ⳳ 0.03**

0.16 Ⳳ 0.02

150 (100)
150 (100)
63 (42.0)

149 (99.3)
150 (100)
71 (47.3)

150 (100)
150 (100)**
99 (66.0)*

150 (100)
137 (91.3)
81 (54.0)

58 (38.7)
18 (12.0)

45 (30.0)
20 (13.3)

108 (72.0)**
56 (37.3)*

36 (24.0)
25 (16.7)

92 (61.3)
58 (38.7)

79 (52.7)
71 (47.3)

43 (28.7)
107 (71.3)**

74 (49.3)
76 (50.7)

12
42
109
46

(8.0)
(28.0)
(72.6)
(30.6)

150 (100)
0 (0)

23
2
127
15

(15.3)
(1.3)
(84.6)
(10.0)

150 (100)
0 (0)

48
54
77
18

(32)
(36)
(51.3)
(12.0)

15 (10.0)
135 (90.0)

45
53
63
40

(30.0)
(35.9)
(42.0)
(26.6)

15 (10.0)
135 (90.0)

note. Data are no. (%), unless otherwise indicated. ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase; MDROs, multidrugresistant microorganisms; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; SD, standard deviation.
a
Because 1 person may have more than 1 MDRO, total sums are more than 100%; the pattern of all MDROs was
different between periods 1 and 2 (P ! .05).
* P ! .05 versus noncohort area in the same study period.
** P ! .001 versus noncohort area in the same study period.

suggest that contact isolation may be harmful to patients by
reducing the frequency and duration of HCW encounters.4,5
We found that creating a cohort area did not reduce the time
spent with patients and actually increased the time spent in
patient care during cohorting with feedback. Although the
reason why is unclear, we postulate that being an open unit
would have an impact on time spent in patient care during
cohort. Despite the creation of a cohort area, compliance with
some infection control practices (eg, wearing a gown) were
still suboptimal.
There are some limitations to this study. This study was
performed in an open unit and may not be generalizable to
other settings. Since we did not measure the transmission
dynamics for MDROs, we cannot conclude that frequent realtime feedback would actually prevent MDRO transmission.
We also did not measure other variables, such as frequency
of patient contact in the cohort area or attitude of HCWs
and patients toward cohorting. Despite these limitations, our
study suggests that compliance of contact isolation and hand
hygiene is significantly increased only when frequent realtime feedback (3 times per week) is performed and that creating a cohort area alone is insufficient to change HCW behavior. Additional studies are needed to evaluate the impact

of strategies to prevent the transmission of MDROs in
resource-limited healthcare settings.
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Patient Isolation in the High-Prevalence
Setting: Challenges with Regard to
Multidrug-Resistant Gram-Negative Bacilli
To the Editor—Isolation of patients for prevention and control
of infections is a standard intervention in infection control
practices. Patients infected or colonized with infective agents
that are potentially transmissible are physically isolated in a
separate room with protective barriers so as to prevent transmission from patients to other patients, staff, or visitors. Examples of infections for which such isolation practices are
implemented include tuberculosis, pandemic viral infections,
chickenpox, measles, infectious diarrhea or vomiting, and
those caused by multidrug-resistant bacteria. Since infections
caused by multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs) have become a major health concern in recent times, these infections
are often the most common cause of keeping a patient under
barrier precautions and preventive isolation.1
The Tata Medical Center is a newly built modern cancer
care center in eastern India. The incidence of communityacquired infections, such as tuberculosis, viral gastroenteritis,
and viral respiratory infections, is relatively low in this hospital, and most infection control concerns are regarding multidrug-resistant healthcare-associated infections. Our experience for the past 19 months has shown that the prevalence
of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is low

in this setting (∼10%), whereas infections caused by multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacilli, such as those caused by
extended-spectrum b-lactamase (ESBL) producers and carbapenem-resistant organisms, comprise the overwhelming
majority of infections (ESBL rate, approximately 70%; carbapenem resistance rate, approximately 20%). A significant
proportion of patients visiting this tertiary care referral hospital are already colonized with various MDROs. Results from
the surveillance cultures of stool samples done near the time
of admission or preintervention in hematology and some
surgical patients show a high rate of colonization of patients
with various MDROs. The surveillance culture antibiogram
is similar in pattern to the antibiogram from diagnostic samples. In this context of high prevalence of MDRO colonization
or infection, universal isolation of patients on the basis of
MDRO status becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible.
The hospital has a 47-bed general ward with 1 isolation room,
an 11-bed intensive care unit with 5 isolation rooms, and a
significant number of single-bed private rooms for patients
requiring general or special medical care who are able to
afford a higher rate. Emergency ward, day care unit, pediatric,
and postoperative patients are managed in open bays that
have a bed capacity of 5–6. Patients coming to this hospital
are assigned a specific bed location on the basis of clinical
need (eg, intensive care/high-dependency support), age group
or specialty (eg, pediatrics), and type of intervention (eg,
chemotherapy in day care unit, postsurgical intervention cases
in surgical bays). For optimal patient placement, it often becomes difficult to achieve a balance among clinical need,
available resources, infection control requirements, and patient preferences.
Being a philanthropic initiative, the hospital has invested
heavily in optimal bed spacing (space between beds of 1.2–
1.5 m against a World Health Organization [WHO]–recommended standard of 1–2 m; area available per patient in
a general ward of 7–8.4 m2), good housekeeping, staff training
and education on infection control, water-quality monitoring,
infection prevention bundles, and optimal selection and use
of disinfectants and less in expensive and difficult-to-maintain isolation rooms.2 Daily infection control e-mail messages
are sent to concerned department doctors, medical administration, nursing, and housekeeping along with the quality
manager to notify them about new MDRO cases. The e-mail
contains standard instructions about WHO guidelines related
to barrier precautions, hand hygiene, enhanced cleanliness,
housekeeping, and use of personal protective equipment
(PPE).2 A biohazard label is electronically flagged in the hospital management system whenever an MDRO is detected in
a patient to remind the user through a visual alert about
infection control precautions to be taken. In the real world
of optimal patient placement and bed management, priority
is often given to clinical needs and logistical feasibility, overriding theoretical infection control concerns. In this hospital,
universal precautions are emphasized and barrier precautions
are followed for patients infected or colonized with MDROs.
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